会计专业外文翻译

外文翻译之一:

Ⅲ.外文翻译

Newer canons of common-stock investment

III

Authors: Benjamin·Graham Nationality: USA Source: Security analysis

Released time and page numbers：1934 366——375页

The trend of earnings,although most dangerous as a sole basis for selection,may prove a useful indication of investment merit. If this approach is a sound one, there may be formulated an acceptable canon of common-stock investment, containing the following elements:

1. Investment is conceived as a group operation, in which diversification of risk is depended upon to yield a favorable average result.

2. The individual issues are selected by means of qualitative and quantitative tests corresponding to those employed in the choice of fixed-value investments.

3. A greater effort is made, than in the case of bond selection, to determine the future outlook of the issues considered.

Secular Expansion as Basis. May the ownership of a carefully selected, diversified group of common stocks, purchased at reasonable prices, be characterized as a sound investment policy? An affirmativeanswer may be developed from any one of three different kinds ofassumptions relating to the future of American business and the policyof selection that is followed. The first will posit that certain basic andlong-established elements in this country’s economic experience may stillbe counted upon. These are (1) that our national wealth and earningpower will increase, (2) that such increase will reflect itself in the increased resources and profits of our important corporations, and (3)that such increases will in the main take place through the normal processof investment of new capital and reinvestment of undistributed earnings. The third part of this assumption signifies that a broad causal connection exists between accumulating surplus and future earning power, so that common-stock selection is not a matter purely of chance or guesswork but should be governed by an analysis of past records in relation to current market prices.

If these fundamental conditions still obtain, then common stocks with suitable exhibits should on the whole present the same favorable opportunities in the future as they have for generations past. The cardinal defect of instability may not be regarded, therefore, as menacing the long-range development of common stocks as a whole. It does indeed exert a powerful temporary effect upon all business through the variations of the economic cycle, and it has permanently adverse effects upon individual enterprises and single industries.

III-1

But of these two dangers, the latter may be offset in part by careful selection and chiefly by wide diversification;the former may be guarded against by unvarying insistence upon the reasonableness of the price paid for each purchase.

In our Introduction we point out that the experience of the last fifteen years weighs against this proposition. Without seeking to prophesy the future, may it not suffice to declare that the investor cannot safely rely upon a general growth of earnings to provide both safety and profit over the long pull? In this respect it would seem that we are back to the investor’s attitude in 1913— with the difference that his caution then seemed needlessly blind to the powerful evidences of secular growth inherent in our economy. Our caution today would appear, at least, to be based on bitter experience and on the recognition of some newer and less promising factors in the whole business picture.

Selection Based on Margin-of-safety Principle. The approach to common-stock investment is based on the margin-of-safety principle. If the analyst is convinced that a stock is worth more than he pays for it, and if he is reasonably optimistic as to the company’s future,he would regard the issue as a suitable component of a group investmentin common stocks. This attack on the problem lends itself to two possible techniques. One is to buy at times when the general market is low,measured by quantitative standards of value. Presumably the purchases would then be confined to representative and fairly active issues. The other technique would be employed to discover undervalued individual common stocks, which presumably are available even when the general market is not particularly low. In either case the “margin of safety” resides in the discount at which the stock is selling below its minimum intrinsic value, as measured by the analyst. But with respect to the hazards and the psychological factors involved, the two approaches differ considerably.

Factors Complicating Efforts to Exploit General Market Swings. A glance at the chart on page 6, showing the fluctuations of common-stock prices since 1900, would suggest that prices are recurrently too high and too low and that consequently there should be repeated opportunities to buy stocks at less than their value and to sell them out later at fair value or higher. A crude method of doing this—but one apparently encouraged by the chart itself—would consist simply of drawing a straight line through the approximate midpoints of past market swings and then planning to buy somewhere below this line and to sell somewhere above it.

Perhaps such a “system” would be as practical as any, but the analyst is likely to insist on a more scientific approach. One possible refinement would operate as follows:

III-2

1. Select a diversified list of leading industrial common stocks.

2. Determine a base or “normal” value for the group by capitalizing their average earnings at some suitable figure, related to the going long term interest rate.

3. Determine a buying point at some percentage below this normal value and a selling point above it. (Or buying and selling may be done “on a scale down” and “on a scale up.”)

A method of this kind has plausible logic to recommend it, and it is favored also by an age-old tradition that success in the stock market is gained by buying at depressed levels and selling out when the public is optimistic. But the reader will suspect at once that there is a catch to it somewhere. What are its drawbacks?

As we see it, the difficulties attending this idea are threefold: First, although the general pattern of the market’s behavior may be properly anticipated, the specific buying and selling points may turn out to have been badly chosen, and the operator may miss his opportunity at one extreme or the other. Second, there is always a chance that the character of the market’s behavior may change significantly, so that a scheme of operation that would have worked well in the past will cease to be practicable. Third, the method itself requires a considerable amount of human fortitude. It generally involves buying and selling when the prevalent psychology favors the opposite course, watching one’s shares go lower after purchase and higher after sale and often staying out of the market for long periods (e.g., 1927–1930) when most people are actively interested in stocks. But despite these disadvantages, which we do not minimize, it is our view that this method has a good deal to commend it to those temperamentally qualified to follow it.

The Undervalued-individual-issue Approach. The other application of the principle of investing in undervalued common stocks is directed at individual issues, which upon analysis appear to be worth substantially more than they are selling for. It is rare that a common stock will appear satisfactory from every qualitative angle and at the same time will be found to be selling at a low price by such quantitative standards as earnings, dividends, and assets. Issues of this type would undoubtedly be eligible for a group purchase that would fulfill our supplementary criterion of “investment” given in Chap. 4. (“An investment operation is one that can be justified on both qualitative and quantitative grounds.”) Of more practical importance is the question whether or not investment can be successfully carried on in common stocks that appear cheap from the quantitative angle and that—upon study—seem to have average prospects for the future. Securities of this type can be found in reasonabe abundance, as a result of the stock market’s obsession

III-3

with companies considered to have unusually good prospects of growth. Because of this emphasis on the growth factor, quite a number of enterprises that are long established, well financed, important in their industries and presumably destined to stay in business and make profits indefinitely in the future, but that have no speculative or growth appeal, tend to be discriminated against by the stock market—especially in years of subnormal profits—and to sell for considerably less than the business would be worth to a private owner.

We incline strongly to the belief that this last criterion—a price far less than value to a private owner—will constitute a sound touchstone for the discovery of true investment opportunities in common stocks. This view runs counter to the convictions and practice of most people seeking to invest in equities, including practically all the investment trusts. Their emphasis is mainly on long-term growth, prospects for the next year, or the indicated trend of the stock market itself. Undoubtedly any of these three viewpoints may be followed successfully by those especially well equipped by experience and native ability to exploit them. But we are not so sure that any of these approaches can be developed into a system or technique that can be confidently followed by everyone of sound intelligence who has studied it with care. Hence we must raise our solitary voice against the use of the term investment to characterize these methods of operating in common stocks, however profitable they may be to the truly skillful. Trading in the market, forecasting next year’s results for various businesses, selecting the best media for long-term expansion—all these have a useful place in Wall Street.

Whether or not our own concept of common-stock investment is a valid one may be more intelligently considered after we have given extended treatment to the chief factors that enter into a statistical analysis of a stock issue. The need for such analysis is quite independent of our investment philosophy. After all, common stocks exist and are actively dealt in by the public. Those who buy and sell will properly seek to arm themselves with an adequate knowledge of financial practice and with the tools and technique necessary for an intelligent analysis of corporate statements.

III-4

中文译文之一：

普通股投资的新原则

作者：本杰明·格雷厄姆 国籍：美国 来源：证券分析

发表时间及页码：1934 366——375

尽管将收益趋势指标作为选择投资对象的唯一标准极具危险性，但它仍不失为一项反映投资品质的有效指标。如果这种方法是可取的，我们就可以构造一组可以接受的普通股投资原则，它们包括：

1.投资应被视为一种组合性操作，风险分散措施时获得令人满意的平均结果的保证。 2.具体证券的选择应采用与固定价值投资选择所采用的定性和定量检验措施相对应的检验措施。

3.对比债券选择而言，更为重视对所考察证券前景的分析。

基本条件：持有一组仔细挑选的、以合理的价格分散购买的普通股，是否可以被定义为一种正确的投资策略呢？要对这个问题作出肯定回答必须基于这样一个假设，即这个国家的经济发展历程中某些基本的和早已形成的规律仍一如既往的可靠。它们包括：（1）整个国家的福利和盈利能力将继续增进；（2）这种增进本身反映在重要的公司企业在资源和利润方面的增长；（3）这种增长主要是追加资本的投资和未分配收益的再投资的正常过程所带来的。第三个假设强调了在累计盈余和未来赢利能力方面存在着明显的因果关系，因此普通股的选择并非完全是一个撞大运或依靠凭空猜测的工作，他必须以在联系现行市场价格的前提下对

III-5

过去记录所进行的分析为根据。

如果这些基本条件依然存在，那么具有良好历史记录的普通股，从整体上来说将和前几十年一样的为人们提供有力的机会。因此，不稳定性这个根本的弱点将不会威胁到普通股整体的长期发展。随着经济周期的波动，不稳定性确实为所有工业部门带来了巨大的短期影响，而且对个别企业和工业部门具有永久性的负面作用。但对于这两种危险，后者可以一方面通过精挑细选，并更重要的通过充分的分散或来加以化解；前一种风险则可以通过采取矢志不移的坚持以合理价格进行没意向购买的方法来加以防范。

在我们的介绍中，我们指出了过去十五年的表现对于这种观点是不利的。一个依然存在的事实是，总的来说，良好的历史记录能够为公司的前景提供比不良记录更为充分的保证。即使充分考虑到未来的种种不确定性，这个结论的正确性也是难以被推翻的。诚然，任何一个具体的企业都可能从失败中复兴，或者由兴盛走向没落；但是如果以一组企业作为考察单位的话，实力雄厚的公司几乎都要比效益差和资产负债结构不良的企业更有前途。

基于边际安全原则的选择

普通股投资的方法是基于边际安全原则的。如果分析家确信一只股票的价值是高于购买它所需的价格，而且分析家对于公司的未来持乐观态度，那么，他可以把它看做构成普通股投资的组合中的理想的一部分。这就涉及到两个技术性的问题。第一就是在市场处于底部时，以一组量化的价值指标间或的买入。很可能这个购买会被证明是具有代表性的，是相当活跃的债券。第二个技巧就是去发现价值被低估的个股，这即使是市场未处于相对低位时也是很可能做到的。在另外的一种情况中，边际安全存在于当证券在低于分析师计算的它们的内在价值出售时。但考虑到意外情况的发生和心理因素的作用，这两种方法差别很大。

利用一般的市场波动使这种努力变得复杂化。看一眼第六页的图表，展示了普通股自1900年以来的变动情况，显示了价格重复的出现过高和过低的同时，也提供了在价格低于他们的价值时买入何在价格高于他们的公允价值或更高时卖出的机会。一个简单也被改图表自身所反映的方法，就是在过去市场波动范围的中间画一条直线，当价格低于这条线的某一部位买入，然后在高于这条线的某一部位卖出。或许这样的一个系统显得很实在，但分析家更倾向于坚持一种更科学的方法。一种可能的改良会是这样：

1．挑选一组广泛的行业龙头公司的普通股

2．对于这组股票确定一个基础或者标准的价值，以一个合适的数值来资本化它们的平均收益，这一数值要与长期利率相联系。

3．在低于和高于标准价值某一百分比时确定一个买入点和卖出点。

这样的一种方法有一种是是而非的逻辑来使它受欢迎，他也被一种在证券市场中被证明是正确的古老传统所青睐，即在经济萧条时买入，在大众乐观时卖出。但公众或许偶尔会疑虑：它是吸引人的，那它的缺点是什么？

正如我们所看到的，理解这样一种观点的困难之处展现在眼前：第一，虽然市场的一般

III-6

走势或许是可以合理预期的，但确定的买点和卖点显然是难于选择的，操作者或许会错过底部的机会和别的机会。第二，市场行为的特点会有很大的概率显著改变，因此，这样的一种操作策略在过去被证明是正确的不一定在未来能发挥实际的作用。第三，这个方法本身需要相当的性格上的坚强。它涉及的买卖通常是与大众流行的看法背道而驰的，当看到证券在买入后下跌，卖出后上涨，并且在学多人热衷于市场时远离市场。尽管有这些不足，我们的观点依然是极力推荐它。

价值被低估问题的解决方法。被低估的普通股投资原则的另一个运用是直接的个别问题，他们运用于当出售价格远远小于他们应有的价值时。一只股票在每一方面同时符合量化的指标，并且在一个相对于她的每股收益来说是低的价位出售，这种情况是非常少见的。如果是债权属于这种类型，那么毫无疑问他们是属于购买的类型，同时这也是我们在第四章给出的投资标准的补充。更具实际意义的问题是这样的，那就是这种投资方法是否能准确的运用于从数量化指标看起来非常便宜的普通股投资上。这类证券能够被大量找到，它是作为这样的一种结果存在的，那就是股票市场对于公司通常具有的美好的增长前景的困惑。因为对成长方面的过分强调，许多设立已久，具有良好的财务状况，在他们各自行业具有重要地位和可能是注定会留存下来，并且在相当长的时间里能创造利润的公司，由于没有投机性或成长方面的吸引力，被市场所歧视，特别是长时间以来的低利润，导致他们以显著低于私人所有而具有的价值的股价出售。

我们强烈的倾向于最后的一个标准——价格显著低于相对于私人所有的价值，这将会是在普通股投资中发现投资机会的可靠标准。这个观点与绝大多数人在股票投资中的实际操作背道而驰，包括几乎所有投资者所信赖的。他们强调的重点在于长期的增长，以及对于来年的预期，或者证券市场本身所标明的趋势。无疑，任一这三种视点当中的一个，可能会带来成功，这种成功是基于经验和天赋。但我们并不十分确信这几个方法能够发展成为一个被每一个投资者经过仔细学习后抱有信心的系统或者一个技术。因此，我们必须发出我们的独特声音，来对抗这种在市场中被使用的方法，纵然很好的掌握它们可能真的会带来赢利。在市场交易中，预测来年各个公司的收益，挑选一个最好的新闻媒体来做长期的扩张，所有这些在华尔街都有用武之地。

我们对于普通股投资的分析是否有效，需要在我们给出拓展的方法之后才能仔细甄别，这种方法就是对一只股票的主要方面进行统计学分析。而对于这种分析的需求是不依赖于我们的投资理念的。大众应该学会用足够的金融实务知识，以及对于有效分析公司财务报表十分必要的工具和技巧来武装自己。

III-7

外文翻译之二：

Intelligent Investing

Author: warren buffett Nationality: USA

Source and Classification: The essays of warren buffett Released time and page numbers：2004; 93--94

Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals.

Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word \"selected\": You don't have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.

To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing, or emerging markets. You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view, though, investment students need only two well-taught courses-How to Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.

Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies that meet these standards-so when you see one that qualifies, you should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a stock for ten years, don't even think about owning

III-8

it for ten minutes. Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.

Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.

中文译文之二：

III-9

聪明的投资

作者：沃伦·巴菲特 国籍：美国

来源：巴菲特致股东的信 发表时间及页码：2004，93—94

让我对你们自己的投资谈一些看法。大多数投资者，机构投资者和个人投资者，会发现拥有普通股的最佳途径是投资收费低廉的指数基金。那些走这条路的投资者肯定能够战胜绝大多数投资专家创造的净收益（扣除管理费和开支以后）。

但是，如果你选择建立自己的投资组合，那么有几种思想值得牢记。聪明的投资并不复杂，尽管说他容易也远不现实。一个投资者需要的是正确估价选中的公司的能力。这一这个词“选中的”：你不必成为每一家公司，或者许多公司的专家，你只需要能够对在能能力范围内的公司股价。范围的大小并不重要：但是，了解它的边界必不可少。

要成功的进行投资，你不需要了解β值，现代投资组合理论，有效市场理论，期权定价，或者新兴市场。实际上，你最好对此一无所知。当然，这不是大多数商学院里盛行的观点，这些学科在商学院的金融课程中占有重要的地位。尽管，我们认为投资专业的学生只需要2门教授得当的课程——如何评估一家公司，以及如何考虑市场价格。

作为一名投资者，你的目标应当仅仅是以理性的价格买入一家有所了解的公司的部分股权，在从现在开始的5年、10年和20年里，这家公司的收益实际上肯定可以大幅增长。在时间的长河中，你会发现只有几家公司符合这些标准——所以一旦看到一家合格的，就应当买入相当数量的股票。你还必须忍受偏离你的指导方针的诱惑，如果你不愿意拥有一家股票10年，那就甚至不要考虑拥有它10分钟。把总的盈利会在未来几年中不断增长的公司聚集到一个投资组合中，那么这个组合的市场价值也会不断增加。

尽管很少被人认知，这正是伯克希尔的股东产生无数利润的方法，多年来我们的收益快步增值，我们的股价也相应的上扬。如果这些收益的增加还没有成形，那么伯克希尔的价值就不会增加。

III-10